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The diverse Kantian movement that emerged within German philosophy in the 1860s, gained a strong
academic foothold in the 1870s, reached its height during the three decades prior to World War I, and
disappeared with the rise of Nazism. The movement was initially focused on renewed study and elaboration
of Kant’s epistemology in response to the growing epistemic authority of the natural sciences and as an
alternative to both Hegelian and speculative idealism and the emerging materialism of, among others,
Ludwig Büchner (1824-99). Later neo-Kantianism explored Kant’s whole philosophy, applied his critical
method to disciplines other than the natural sciences, and developed its own philosophical systems. Some
originators and/or early contributors were Kuno Fischer (1824-1907), Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-94),
Friedrich Albert Lange (1828-75), Eduard Zeller (1814-1908), and Otto Liebmann (1840-1912), whose Kant
und die Epigonen (1865) repeatedly stated what became a neo-Kantian motto, “Back to Kant!”
Several forms of neo-Kantianism are to be distinguished. T.K. Oesterreich (1880-1949), in Friedrich
Ueberwegs Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie (“F.U.’s Compendium of the History of
Philosophy”, 1923), developed the standard, somewhat chronological, classification:
1. The physiological neo-Kantianism of Helmholtz and Lange, who claimed that physiology is “developed or
corrected Kantianism.”
2. The metaphysical neo-Kantianism of the later Liebmann, who argued for a Kantian “critical metaphysics”
(beyond epistemology) in the form of “hypotheses” about the essence of things.
3. The realist neo-Kantianism of Alois Riehl (1844-1924), who emphasized the real existence of Kant’s thing-
in-itself.
4. The logistic-methodological neo-Kantianism of the Marburg School of Hermann Cohen (1842—1918) and
Paul Natorp (1854—1924).
5. The axiological neo-Kantianism of the Baden or Southwest German School of Windelband (1848-1915)
and Heinrich Rickert (1863—1936).
6. The relativistic neo-Kantianism of Georg Simmel (1858-1918), who argued for Kantian categories relative
to individuals and cultures.
7. The psychological neo-Kantianism of Leonard Nelson (1882-1927), originator of the Göttingen School;
also known as the neo-Friesian School, after Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773—1843), Nelson’s self-proclaimed
precursor. Like Fries, Nelson held that Kantian a priori principles cannot be transcendentally justified, but
can be discovered only through introspection.
Oesterreich’s classification has been narrowed or modified, partly because of conflicting views on how
distinctly “Kantian” a philosopher must have been to be called “neo-Kantian.” The very term ‘neo-Kantianism’
has even been called into question, as suggesting real intellectual commonality where little or none is to be
found. There is, however, growing consensus that Marburg and Baden neo-Kantianism were the most
important and influential.
Marburg School
Its founder, Choen, developed its characteristic Kantian idealism of the natural sciences by arguing that
physical objects are truly known only through the laws of these sciences and that these laws presuppose the
application of Kantian a priori principles and concepts. Cohen elaborated this idealism by eliminating Kant’s
dualism of sensibility and understanding, claiming that space and time are construction methods of “pure
thought” rather than a priori forms of perception and that the notion of any “given” (perceptual data) prior to
the “activity” of “pure thought” is meaningless. Accordingly, Cohen reformulated Kant’s thing-in-itself as the
regulative idea that the mathematical description of the world can always be improved. Cohen also
emphasized that “pure thought” refers not to individual consciousess—on his account Kant had not yet
sufficiently left behind a “subject—object” epistemology—but rather to the content of his own system of a
priori principles, which he saw as subject to change with the progress of science. Just as Cohen held that
epistemology must be based on the “fact of science,” he argued, in a decisive step beyond Kant, that ethics
must transcendentally deduce both the moral law and the ideal moral subject from a humanistic science—
more specifically, from jurisprudence’s notion of the legal person. This analysis led to the view that the moral
law demands that all institutions, including economic enterprises, become democratic—so that they display
unified wills and intentions as transcendental conditions of the legal person—and that all individuals become
colegislators. Thus Cohen arrived at his frequently cited claim that Kant “is the true and real originator of
German socialism.” Other important Marburg Kantians were Cohen’s colleague Natorp, best known for his
studies on Plato and philosophy of education, and their students Karl Vorländer (1860-1928), who focused
on Kantian socialist ethics as a corrective of orthodox Marxism, and Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945).
Baden School
The basic task of philosophy and its transcendental method is seen as identifying universal values that make
possible culture in its varied expressions. This focus is evident in Windelband’s influential insight that the
natural sciences seek to formulate general laws—nomothetic knowledge—while the historical sciences
seek to describe unique events—idiographic knowledge. This distinction is based on the values (interests)
of mastery of nature and understanding and reliving the unique past in order to affirm our individuality.
Windelband’s view of the historical sciences as idiographic raised the problem of selection central to his
successor Rickert’s writings: How can historians objectively determine which individual events are historically
significant? Rickert argued that this selection must be based on the values that are generally recognized
within the cultures under investigation, not on the values of historians themselves. Rickert also developed
the transcendental argument that the objectivity of the historical sciences necessitates the assumption that
the generally recognized values of different cultures approximate in various degrees universally valid values.
This argument was rejected by Weber, whose methodological work was greatly indebted to Rickert.
See also Cassirer, Cohen, Kant, Lange, transcendental argument, Windelband.
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